Global Economic Prospects

# Global Economic Prospects *June 2022*

**Collette Wheeler** 



## **Three Questions**

What are near-term prospects and risks for the global and ECA economy?


Which threat does stagflation present for EMDEs?

- What are the lessons from the 1970s for policy responses to food and energy price shocks, especially in the context of the green transition?
- \* EMDEs = Emerging Market and Developing Economies; ECA = EMDE Europe and Central Asia



## **Global Backdrop**

## Higher Commodity Prices; Tighter Financial Conditions; Weaker Trade Growth



Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank.

Left Panel. Monthly data from World Bank's *Pink Sheet*. Last observation is May 2022. Center Panel. Based on Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index. Higher index numbers reflect tighter financial conditions. The aggregates are computed using GDP weights at 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates, based on 25 economies (including Euro Area)—12 advanced economies and 13 EMDEs. Line for EMDEs excludes data for the Russian Federation. Last observation is June 1, 2022. Right Panel. Trade measured as the average of export and import volumes. January 2022 refers to forecasts presented in the January 2022 *Global Economic Prospects* report..



#### **Global Growth Forecasts**

## Sharper Slowdown in 2022-23

#### **GDP** growth

(Percent)

						Change from January 2022	
	2013-19	2020	2021e	2022f	2023f	2022	2023
World	2.9	-3.3	5.7	2.9	3.0	-1.2	-0.2
Advanced economies	2.0	-4.6	5.1	2.6	2.2	-1.2	-0.1
EMDEs	4.5	-1.6	6.6	3.4	4.2	-1.2	-0.2
East Asia and Pacific	6.6	1.2	7.2	4.4	5.2	-0.7	0.0
<b>Europe and Central Asia</b>	2.7	-1.9	6.5	-2.9	1.5	-5.9	-1.4
Excluding Russia and Ukraine	4.0	<i>-1.3</i>	<i>7.9</i>	2.8	3.5	-0.6	-0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.3	-6.4	<b>6.7</b>	2.5	1.9	-0.1	-0.8
Middle East and North Africa	2.6	-3.7	3.4	5.3	3.6	0.9	0.2
South Asia	6.5	-4.5	<b>7.6</b>	6.8	<b>5.8</b>	-0.8	-0.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.1	-2.0	4.2	<b>3.7</b>	3.8	0.1	0.0


Source: World Bank.



## **Changes in Growth Forecasts for 2022**

## Downgrades for Most Countries

Countries by the type of growth forecast revisions since January for 2022



Source: World Bank.



### **Global Growth Forecasts**

## Sharper Slowdown in 2022-23

#### **GDP** growth


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Source: World Bank.

### **ECA Growth Forecasts for 2022**

## Downgrades are especially pronounced due to sizable spillovers



Source: World Bank.

Note: CA = Central Asia; CE = Central Europe; RUS = Russian Federation; SCC = South Caucasus; TUR = Turkey; UKR = Ukraine; WBK = Western Balkans.

Left Panel. Aggregates calculated using constant GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates. The sample includes 23 ECA countries. Right Panel. Bars denote latest forecast; diamonds correspond to January 2022 forecasts in the Global Economic Prospects report.



## Risks

## Mutually Amplifying Downside Risks

**Geopolitical tensions** 

**Stagflation** 

**Energy and food insecurity** 

**Social tensions** 

Weaker longer-term growth prospects

**Additional supply disruptions** 

**Financial stress** 

**COVID-19 outbreaks** 


**Climate-related disasters** 

Fragmentation of trade, investment, and financial networks



## Global Growth Outcomes Under Different Risk Scenarios

#### Much Lower Growth if Risks Materialize






#### **ECA Growth Outcomes Under Different Risk Scenarios**

## Much Steeper Fall if Risks Materialize

Percent deviations of ECA output (baseline and downside scenario) from pre-war baseline (Percent deviation from pre-war baseline)



Source: Oxford Economics:, World Bank,

Note: ECA = Europe and Central Asia. Scenario outcomes produced using the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model. Figure shows the percent deviation from the prewar baseline in ECA output as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Prewar is defined as projections published in the January 2022 edition of the Global Economic Prospects report. "Baseline" entails current projections as reflected in table 2.2.2. "Downside" entails a scenario in which the war's impact is much more severe, as outlined in World Bank (2022). It assumes that an escalation of the war triggers additional sanctions and reduces Russian exports to the euro area. The downside scenario also assumes a shock to financial confidence, a 20 percent contraction in Russian GDP, and a 75 percent contraction in Ukrainian GDP. The Oxford Global Economic Model (GEM)—a large-scale global semi-structural projection model—is used to conduct the simulations described here (Oxford Economics 2019).



# **Risks** *Mutually Amplifying Downside Risks*

**Geopolitical tensions** 

**Stagflation** 

**Energy and food insecurity** 

**Social tensions** 

Weaker longer-term growth prospects

**Additional supply disruptions** 

Financial stress

**COVID-19 outbreaks** 

**Climate-related disasters** 


Fragmentation of trade, investment, and financial networks




## **Rising Global Temperatures**

## Underscore the need to tackle climate change


Rise in global median surface temperature (Degrees Celsius)



Share of renewables in global energy supply (Percent)




Source: BP (database), IEA (2021b), World Bank.






## **Adverse Weather Events Pose Risks to Food Supplies**

Risks have been magnified by supply disruptions from invasion and war





Source: FSIN and GNAFC (2022), World Bank.

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies. Data from the Food Security Information Network's Global Report on Food Crises 2022.




## **Three Questions**

Which threat does stagflation present for EMDEs? The 1970s stagflation ended with a series of financial crises in EMDEs. These economies are now facing a rising risk of a similar outcome.




## **Global Stagflation?**

## High Inflation, Tepid Growth



Sources: Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; World Bank.







## **Inflation Prospects**

## Above Target Almost Everywhere; Decline Expected in 2023

# Countries with inflation above target (Percent of countries)



## Model-based global CPI inflation projection (Percent)





Sources: International Monetary Fund; World Bank.



## **Growth Prospects: Weaker, Less Attractive to Investors**

## Weakening Growth Fundamentals; Downgrades to Long-Term Expectations





Advanced

economies

Sources: Consensus Economics; World Bank.


Left Panel. GDP-weighted average (at 2010 prices and exchange rates) for 82 countries, including 52 EMDEs. Potential growth estimates based on a production function approach as described in Kilic Celik, Kose, and Ohnsorge (2020) and World Bank (2021b). 2020s forecasts in red bars assume that investment grows as expected by consensus forecasts, working-age population and life expectancy evolve as envisaged by the UN Population Projections, and secondary and tertiary school enrollment and completion rates decline by 2.5 percentage points. Right PanelResults from the latest Consensus Economics surveys in each year are presented. Sample includes 84 countries (33 advanced economies and 51 EMDEs). The horizontal axis shows the years when Consensus Economics forecasts are surveyed.



**EMDEs** 

#### Similarities to the 1970s

## Steep Growth Slowdown, Surges in Commodity Prices




Sources: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve Economic Data; Haver Analytics; World Bank.

Left Panel. Percent change in monthly energy and food price indices over a 24-month period. This facilitates a comparison of the April 2020 trough with the most recent data (April 2022). Due to data limitations, prior to 1979, the energy price change is proxied using the oil price change. Right Panel. Figure shows changes in global growth (in percentage points) between 2021-24 and 1975-79; covers three years following a rebound from a global recession.



#### Similarities to the 1970s

## Accommodative Monetary Policy; EMDE Financial Vulnerabilities




Sources: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve Economic Data; Haver Analytics; World Bank.

Left Panel. Figure shows nominal and real (CPI-adjusted) short-term interest rates (Treasury bill rates or money market rates, with the maturity of three months or less). Global interest rates are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. Sample includes 113 countries, though the sample size varies by year. Right Panel: GDP-weighted averages based on a sample of up to 153 EMDEs.




#### **EMDE External Debt Vulnerabilities**

## Greater external exposure and tighter financing conditions



Sources: Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose et al. (2020); Kose, Sugawara, and Terrones (2021); World Bank.


Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies.





#### Differences from the 1970s

## More Inflation Targeting; Better-Anchored Expectations




Sources: Ha, Kose, and Ohnsorge (2019); International Monetary Fund; OECD; World Bank.


Left Panel. Based on the clarification of IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and country-specific sources. Right Panel: Inflation expectations are five-year-ahead expectations of annual inflation. Inflation shocks are defined as the difference between realized inflation and short-term inflation expectations in the previous period. Sensitivity is estimated using a panel regression of the change in five-year-ahead inflation expectations on inflation shocks. Bars denote medians and vertical lines denote 90 percent confidence intervals. Sample period is divided into the first (1990-2004) and second (2005-2018) sub-periods. Based on a sample of 24 advanced economies and 23 EMDEs.




#### Differences from the 1970s

### For Now, Still Lower Inflation Pressures










## **Monetary Policy**

## Global Monetary Policy Tightening Underway



Sources: Bloomberg, Haver Analytics, World Bank.


Left Panel. Sample includes 22 EMDEs. Nominal policy rates using real GDP as weights. Last observation is May 2022. Center and Right Panels. Market expected interest rates based on overnight interest rate swaps. Current futures (for Center Panel) is based on data from June 30, 2022. For Right Panel, January is based on data from June and June on data from June 2, 2022.




## **Ending Stagflation**

## Sharp Rate Hikes





# Global interest rates and U.S. exchange rate (Percent) (Index)




Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Federal Reserve Economic Data; Havers Analytics; World Bank.

Left Panel. Blue bars show the extent of policy rate increases during previous tightening cycles: 1979-81, 1983-84, 1986-89, 1994-95, 1999-2000, 2004-06, 2015-19. Value for 2023 is an estimate based on market expectations for the level of the Fed Funds rate in mid-2023. Core CPI for 2022-23 shows latest data associated with tightening cycle. Right Panel: Figure shows nominal short-term interest rates (Treasury bill rates or money market rates, with the maturity of three months or less) and nominal effective exchange rate for the U.S. dollar. Global interest rates are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. Sample includes 113 countries, though the sample size varies by year.



## **End of Stagflation**

## Global Recession, EMDE Financial Crises





## **Three Questions**

What are the lessons from the 1970s for policy responses to food and energy price shocks, especially in the context of green transition? Avoid subsidies, price controls, trade restrictions. Improve efficiency, incentivize new supplies.



## **Global Policy Priorities**

Alleviate Short-Term Pressures; Build Long-Term Foundations

#### Mitigate the effects of the war in Ukraine

- Support humanitarian relief efforts
- Alleviate food insecurity in vulnerable countries
- Undertake reconstruction efforts in areas devastated by the war in Ukraine

#### Support green, resilient, and inclusive recovery

- Accelerate vaccine rollout, strengthen pandemic preparedness
- Provide debt relief where needed
- Facilitate energy transition away from fossil fuels
- Bolster rules-based international economic order to guard against fragmentation of trade, investment, and financial networks

## **National Policy Priorities**

Manage Short-Term Policy Tradeoffs; Build Long-Term Foundations

#### Macroeconomic policies

- Monetary policy. Prioritize price stability, calibrating policy to avoid derailing recovery
- Fiscal policy. Ensure fiscal sustainability while preserving investment and social spending
- Financial policy. Enhance financial sector resilience

#### Structural policies

- Integrate refugees and migrant workers; expand public services
- Improve business climates, promote education, strengthen human capital, raise female labor participation, and boost productivity
- Implement targeted support instead of distortionary policies to respond to high food and energy prices

## **Coping with High Food and Energy Prices**

Mostly Distortive Policies Employed so far; Better Options Available

#### Policy responses employed so far


- Reduction in fuel taxes; introduction of fuel subsidies
- Export restrictions on wheat and fertilizers
- Measures to boost energy supply (easing regulations on new installation of renewables)

#### Policy recommendations

- Avoid export bans and price controls
- Prioritize income support over subsidies; if subsidies are needed, ensure they are temporary
- Reduce waste; introduce incentives for efficiency
- Do not divert land to biofuel commodities
- Invest in renewable energy; invest in food technologies to raise yields
- Improve market transparency, facilitate policy dialog

# Responses to Commodity Price Shocks

Avoid Trade Restrictions; Subsidies



Sources: Ag-Incentives Database; BP; FSIN and GNAFC (2021); Ivanic and Martin (2014); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank.


Left Panel. Bars represent the sum of people in high levels of food insecurity, as reflected by being in phase 3 or above of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for 2021.

Missing data for each country are imputed based on the regional rate change from 2020 to 2021. Sample size includes 3 SAR (South Asia), 37 SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), 9 MNA (Middle East and North Africa), and 8 LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) economies. Center Panel. Estimates based on an error correction model described in Laborde, Lakatos, and Martin (2019). Based on data for 82 countries for the period 2010-11.



## Responses to Commodity Price Shocks

Encourage New Supplies, Efficiency




Sources: BP, International Energy Agency U.S. Department of Agriculture, World Bank.

Left Panel. Oil production as share of global production. Right Panel: Energy includes coal, natural gas, and oil. TOE stands for tonnes (metric tons) of oil equivalent. Aggregates calculated using GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.


# **Urgent Policy Action Needed Tackle Climate Change**

## Efforts could be complemented with other policy priorities

# Infrastructure investment gaps and recent fiscal packages



#### Share of greenhouse gas emissions covered by carbon . . .



Source: Carbon Pricing Dashboard. Global Infrastructure Hub and Oxford Economics (2017), Haver Analytics, World Bank.

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies. AEs = advanced economies; EU = European union.

Left Panel. Blue bars show the infrastructure investment gap between 2017 and 2040, calculated as the difference between (1) baseline forecasts of infrastructure investment under the assumption that countries continue to invest in line with the pre-2015 trend and (2) the estimated investment needs if countries were to match the performance of their best performing peers, after controlling for differences in the characteristics of each country. Infrastructure investment gap in European Union includes Croatia, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, and Spain. "Other AEs" refers to other advanced economies, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States. Red bar shows the planned new federal spending under the U.S. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. Right Panel. Figure shows the proportion of global greenhouse gas emissions covered by carbon-pricing measures. Sample includes 9 EMDEs and 24 advanced economies.



## **Three Questions**

- What are near-term prospects for the global and ECA economy? Much shaper global slowdown than expected in January 2022, with broad-based forecast downgrades. Multiple downside risks cloud the outlook.
- Which threat does stagflation present for EMDEs? The 1970s stagflation ended with a series of financial crises in EMDEs. These economies are now facing a rising risk of a similar outcome.

What are the lessons from the 1970s for policy responses to food and energy price shocks, especially in the context of the green transition? Avoid subsidies, price controls, trade restrictions. Improve efficiency, incentivize new supplies and seize opportunities.

<sup>\*</sup> EMDEs = Emerging Market and Developing Economies; ECA = EMDE Europe and Central Asia



# Thanks! fohnsorge@worldbank.org

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